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Abstract. Recently, Li and Lee proposed a new remote 
user authentication scheme using smart card. However, 
their scheme requires a verification table and the user’s 
identity is not protected. Moreover, users cannot 
change their password off-line. In order to overcome 
the security flaws, we propose a new scheme which 
provides more security without affecting the merits of 
the original scheme. 
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1 Introduction 
The use of new electronic services, such as e-
government, requires strong security. Among the 
security components used to protect the access 
to data stored in a server, the remote user 
authentication process is a key element. Remote 
user authentication schemes are used to verify 
and validate the legitimacy of each user by means 
of the knowledge of specific security parameters. 
The first remote user authentication scheme 
for an open network was proposed in [10]. The 
scheme is based on one-way hash function, such 
as MD5 [20] or SHA-2 [19]. However, the scheme 
requires that the server stores a password list 
making it vulnerable to threats of revealing 
passwords in the directory [3] or modifying the 
verification table [8]. 
In 1991, a remote user authentication scheme 
with smart cards and without verification table 
was proposed in [3]. Since 1991, several remote 
user authentication schemes using smart cards 
have been proposed [21, 22, 25, 26] to enhance 
security. Unfortunately, in those schemes, the 
user sends its identity over a common channel to 
the server making them susceptible to identity-
theft attack [6]. 
Later, Das, Saxena, and Gulati proposed the 
first dynamic ID-based remote user authentication 
scheme [6]. The concept of dynamic ID prevents 
that an attacker can know the user’s identity. 
Since the proposal of Das et al., several dynamic 
ID-based remote user authentication schemes [1, 
4, 7, 9, 11, 14, 16, 17, 18, 23, 24, 27] have been 
proposed with the attempt to reduce 
security vulnerabilities. 
In 2011, Li and Lee proposed a robust remote 
user authentication scheme [13] and claimed that 
their scheme is more secure than those in 
previous work. However, we demonstrate that 
their scheme does not achieve all the security 
goals [12, 15] which a strong remote user 
authentication scheme should provide, such as 
protect the identity of each user during the login 
phase, also, it does not maintain a verification 
table and password change off-line. 
In this paper, we aim to modify the scheme 
proposed by Li and Lee and propose a new 
scheme. The new scheme keeps the merits of Li-
Lee’s scheme. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. 
In Section 2, we present a brief review of Li-Lee’s 
scheme. We show the security flaws of Li-Lee’s 
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scheme in Section 3. In Section 4, we present our 
scheme. The security evaluation and comparison 
of the proposed scheme is described in Section 5. 
We conclude the paper with Section 6. 
2 Review of Li-Lee’s Scheme 
In this section, we briefly review the scheme 
proposed in [13]. The notation used in this paper 
is summarized in Table 1. 
2.1 Registration Phase  
In this phase, the user and the server carry out 
the registration process as follows: 
1. U  S: ID, h(h(PW  RU1)) 
2. S: C1 = h(ID || x || N)  h(h(PW  RU1)) 
3. S: STORE ID, N, h(h(PW  RU1)) INTO 
Database 
4. S  U: SC containing h(.), ID and C1 
5. U: STORE RU1 INTO SC 
2.2 Login Phase  
In this phase, the user computes the login request 
message by means of the following process: 
1. U  SC: ID, PW, RU2 
2. SC: GENERATE RSC1 
3. SC: C2 = h(PW  RU1) 
4. SC: C3 = C1  h(C2) 
5. SC: C4 = C3  C2 
6. SC: C5 = h(h(PW  RU2)) 
7. SC: SK = h(C2 || C3) 
8. SC: C6 = ESK{ C5  RSC1 } 
9. U  S: ID, C4, C6 
2.3 Verification Phase  
In this phase, the server and the user verify the 
identity of each other by means of the following 
process: 
1. S: IF ID* ≠ ID THEN Abort 
2. S: C7 = h(ID || x || N) 
3. S: C8 = C4  C7 
4. S: C9 = h(C8) 
5. S: IF C9 ≠ h(h(PW  RU1)) THEN Abort 
6. S: SK = h(C8 || C7) 
7. S: (C5  RSC1) = DSK{ C6 } 
8. S: GENERATE RS1 
9. S: C10 = ESK{ C5 || RSC1 || RS1 } 
10. S: REPLACE h(h(PW  RU1)) by C5 INTO 
Database 
11. S  U: C10 
Table 1. Notation 
Notation Meaning 
U The user 
ID The identity of U 
PW The password of U 
SC The smart card of U 
S The server 
x, y The secret key of S 
h( ) One-way hash function 
SK The session key between U and S 
ESK{ } Symmetric encryption function using 
SK 
DSK{ } Symmetric decryption function using 
SK 
RU The nonce generated by U 
RSC The nonce generated by SC 
RS The nonce generated by S 
N The number of times U re-registers to 
S 
 Exclusive-OR operation 
|| String concatenation operation 
 Secure channel 
 Common channel 
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12. SC: (C5* || RSC1* || RS1*) = DSK{ C10 } 
13. SC: C5* || RC1* ?= C5 || RSC1  
14. SC: REPLACE RU1 by RU2 and C1 by C3  C5 
15. U  S: h(RS1) 
16. S: IF h(RS1)* ≠ h(RS1) THEN Abort 
17. U: SK = h(RSC1  RS1) 
18. S: SK = h(RSC1  RS1) 
2.4 Password Update Phase  
In this phase, the user and the server perform the 
update password process as follows: 
1. U  SC: ID, PW, PWnew, RU3 
2. C2 = h(PW  RU2) 
3. C3 = C1  h(C2) 
4. C4 = C3  C2 
5. C5 = h(h(PWnew  RU 3)) 
6. SK = h(C2 || C3) 
7. C6 = ESK{ C5  RSC2 } 
8. U  S: ID, C4, C6 
9. Carry out the verification phase 
10. REPLACE h(h(PW  RU1)) by C5 INTO 
Database 
11. S  U: C10 
12. SC: (C5* || RSC1* || RS1) = DSK{C10} 
13. SC: C5* || RSC1* ?= C5 || RSC1 
14. SC: REPLACE RU1 by RU3 and C1 by C3  C5 
3 Security Flaws of Li-Lee’s Scheme 
In this section, we carry out a security analysis of 
the scheme proposed in [13], based on the 
security goals described in [12, 15]. 
Without verification table: in this case, the 
scheme proposed by Li and Lee fails. The server 
must maintain a verification table. 
Users choose password freely: in this case, 
the scheme proposed by Li and Lee achieves this 
goal. The user chooses her identity and password 
in the registration phase. 
No password reveal: in this case, the goal is 
achieved. The user sends h(h(PW  RU1)) to the 
server instead of her password. 
Mutual authentication: this goal is achieved 
because the server sends security parameters 
(C10 || RC1 || RS1) encrypted with the session key 
SK = h(C8 || C7) which can be computed only with 
the knowledge of X and N. On the other hand, the 
user needs to decrypt the message using the 
session key which can be computed only with the 
knowledge of C2 = h(PW  RU1). 
Session key agreement: this goal is achieved 
because the server and the user compute the 
same session key for carrying out the mutual 
authentication process. 
User anonymity: in this case, the scheme 
proposed by Li and Lee fails. The user sends her 
identity over a public network. 
Efficiency for wrong password login: in this 
case, the scheme proposed by Li and Lee fails. 
The smart card does not verify the validity of PW 
before it initializes the creation of the login 
request message. 
4 Proposed Scheme 
This section describes the process for a new 
dynamic ID-based remote user authentication 
scheme. It is based on one-way hash function 
and symmetric cryptography. The scheme allows 
the user to establish a session key and get 
access to the server, but at the same the user 
does not reveal her ID. 
The initial assumptions are 1) the bit length of 
the secret keys and nonce is 256, 2) the one-way 
function used is SHA-2, and 3) the one-way 
function is public. 
4.1 Registration Phase  
When the user wants to be part of the system, 
she chooses an ID and PW, and then hashes the 
ID and PW to create a message digest. Next, the 
user sends the message digest to the server over 
a secure channel. Upon receiving the message 
digest from the user, the server computes the 
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security parameters (steps 2 to 4) using 
exclusive-or operation, string concatenation 
operation and one-way hash function. Then, the 
server stores the security parameters into the 
user’s smart card and delivers the smart card to 
the user. The process is as follows: 
1. U  S: RU1, h(ID || PW ) 
2. S: C1 = h(h(x || y || RU1) || h(x  y) || RU1) 
 h(ID || PW) 
3. S: C2 = h(h(h(x || y || RU1) || h(x  y) || 
RU1)) 
4. S: C3 = h(h(x  y) || h(x) || h(y) || RU1) 
5. S  U: SC containing h(.), RU1, C1, C2, C3 
4.2 Login Phase  
Whenever a user wants to get access to the 
server, she inserts the smart card into the smart 
card reader and keys the correct ID and PW. 
Then, the smart card verifies the correctness of 
the ID and PW by means of steps 2, 3 and 4. If 
the verification is positive, the smart card 
computes the login request message. As a result, 
the user gets a unique login request message 
(RU1, C4, C5) which does not have its ID or PW in 
clear text. In step 9, the smart card sends the 
login request message to the server over an open 
channel. It is very important to note that it is very 
hard to link the ID of the user with the login 
request message. The process is as follows: 
1. U  SC: ID, PW 
2. SC: h(h(x || y || RU1) || h(x  y) || RU1)* = 
C1  h(ID || PW) 
3. SC: C2* = h(h(h(x || y || RU1) || h(x  y) || 
RU1)*) 
4. SC: IF C2* ≠ C2 THEN Abort 
5. SC: GENERATE RSC1 
6. SC: C4 = h(h(x || y || RU1) || h(x  y) || 
RU1)  h(ID || PW || RSC1) 
7. SC: SK = h(h(h(x || y || RU1) || h(x  y) || 
RU1) || C3 || h(ID || PW || RSC1)) 
8. SC: C5 = ESK{ C3, RSC1 } 
9. SC  S: RU1, C4, C5 
4.3 Verification Phase  
Upon receiving the login request message, the 
server verifies the legitimacy of the user by 
means of steps 1 to 6. If the verification is 
positive, the server generates a nonce RU2 and 
uses it to compute new security parameters 
(steps 8 to 11) for the user. Then, the server 
generates a nonce RS1 and uses it to compute the 
secret parameter between the server and the 
smart card h(RSC1  RS1). In step 15, it sends the 
login response message. 
Upon receiving the login response message, 
the user’s smart card decrypts the message using 
the session key. Then it computes and verifies the 
validity of the secret parameter h(RSC1  RS1). If 
the verification is positive, the smart card replaces 
the old value of C1, C2, C3, RU1 by a new one 
C1new, C2new, C3new, RU2 and the mutual 
authentication is done. 
1. S: h(h(x || y || RU1) || h(x  y) || RU1)* 
2. S: h(h(x  y) || h(x) || h(y) || RU1)* 
3. S: h(ID || PW || RSC1)* = h(h(x || y || RU1) 
|| h(x  y) || RU1)*  C4 
4. S: SK = h(h(h(x || y || RU1) || h(x  y) || 
RU1)* || h(h(x  y) || h(x) || h(y) || RU1)* 
|| h(ID || PW || RSC1)*) 
5. S: C3, RSC1 = DSK{ C5 } 
6. S: IF C3 ≠ h(h(x  y) || h(x) || h(y) || RU1)* 
THEN Abort 
7. S: GENERATE RU2 
8. S: h(h(x || y || RU2) || h(x  y) || RU2) 
9. S: C1new = h(h(x || y || RU2) || h(x  y) || 
RU2)  h(ID || PW || RSC1) 
10. S: C2new = h(h(h(x || y || RU2) || h(x  y) || 
RU2)) 
11. S: C3new = h(h(x  y) || h(x) || h(y) || RU2) 
12. S: GENERATE RS1 
13. S: h(RSC1  RS1) 
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14. S: C6 = ESK{ C1new, C2new, C3new, RU2, RS1,  
h(RSC1  RS1)} 
15. S  SC: C6 
16. SC: C1new, C2new, C3new, RU2, RS1, h(RSC1  RS1) 
= ESK{ C6 } 
17. SC: h(RSC1  RS1)* 
18. SC: IF h(RSC1  RS1)* ≠ h(RSC1  RS1)  
THEN Abort 
19. SC: REPLACE C1 by C1new, C2 by C2new, C3 by 
C3new, and RU1 by RU2 
4.4 Password Change Phase  
This phase is invoked whenever the user requires 
changing her PW for a new one PWnew. The user 
inserts her smart card into the smart card reader 
and then types her ID and PW. Then, the user’s 
smart card computes the following operations: 
1. U  SC: ID, PW, PWnew 
2. SC: h(h(x || y || RU1) || h(x  y) || RU1)* = 
C1  h(ID || PW) 
3. SC: C2* = h(h(h(x || y || RU1) || h(x  y) || 
RU1)*) 
4. SC: IF C2* ≠ C2 THEN Abort 
5. SC: C1new = h(h(x || y || RU1) || h(x  y) || 
RU1)   h(ID || PWnew) 
6. SC: REPLACE C1 by C1new 
5 Security Evaluation and Comparison 
In this section, we show that our proposed 
scheme resists very well-known attacks and 
achieves the security goals described in [12, 15]. 
Moreover, we carry out the formal verification of 
our protocol using the AVISPA tool to validate 
its security. 
5.1 Security Analysis 
We demonstrate that the proposed scheme is 
secure against very well-known attacks. 
Off-line guessing attack: an adversary may 
attempt to extract the server secret keys (x, y) 
from C1, C2, C3. However, this attack will fail 
because it is computationally infeasible to invert 
the one-way hash function. Moreover, if the 
adversary is a legal user, she can recover h(h(x 
|| y || RU1) || h(x  y) || RU1) from C1, 
however, she cannot obtain x and y from h(h(x || 
y || RU1) || h(x  y) || RU1). 
Masquerade user attack: if an adversary may 
attempt to masquerade as a valid user, she must 
be able to forge a valid login request message 
(RU1, C4, C5). However, she cannot compute a 
valid C4 = h(h(x || y || RU1) || h(x  y) || RU1) 
 h(ID || PW || RSC1) without the knowledge of 
ID, PW, x, and y. Moreover, the adversary should 
be capable to compute the session key SK = 
h(h(h(x || y || RU1) || h(x  y) || RU1) || C3 || 
h(ID || PW || RSC1)) which at this point is 
very hard. 
Masquerade server attack: if an adversary 
attempts to masquerade as a server, she must be 
able to forge a valid login response message C6 = 
ESK{ C1new, C2new, C3new, RU2, RS1, h(RSC1  RS1)}. 
However, the attacker does not know the correct 
values of x, y, and C3, which makes it very hard to 
compute the correct session key. 
Stolen database attack: in this scheme, the 
server does not maintain a verification table which 
stores sensitive information related with 
each user. 
Parallel session attack: if the adversary has 
captured previous communications between the 
victim and the server, the adversary may attempt 
to impersonate as a legal user. However, the 
value of RUi, C4 and C5 are different each time 
because the value of RUi is updated. 
Leak of password attack: if the adversary 
obtains the victim’s smart card, she cannot 
recover ID or PW from C1, C2 or C3 or any 
combination of them. 
5.2 Security Goals 
We demonstrate that the proposed scheme 
achieves the security goals described in [12, 15]. 
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Early detection of incorrect password: in this 
scheme, if an adversary obtains the victim’s smart 
card and she tries to initialize the login phase, she 
will fail because she must be authenticated by the 
smart card before she initializes the login phase. 
In this case, the adversary needs to know the 
correct ID and PW. 
Without verification table: in this scheme, the 
server does not maintain a verification table 
or database. 
Users choose password freely: in this scheme, 
each user chooses her password freely without 
the participation of the server. 
No password reveal: this security goal is 
achieved; the user shares h(ID || PW) with the 
server instead of her password in clear. 
User anonymity: this security goal is achieved; 
the user does not send her ID in clear to the 
server over an open channel. 
Mutual authentication: this goal is achieved 
because the smart card and the server verify the 
identity of each other. 
Session key agreement: this goal is achieved 
because the smart card and the server compute 
the same session key to encrypt and decrypt 
sensitive information. 
5.3 Formal Verification 
We model our protocol using AVISPA (Automated 
Validation of Internet Security Protocols and 
Applications) [2] tool. The specifications of the 
protocol are in HLPSL (High-Level Protocol 
Specification Language) [5]. An HLPSL is divided 
into roles played by any entity in the protocol, as 
well as the session and environment roles. 
Moreover, it is necessary to define the security 
goals that have to be done by the protocol. 
In the validation process, we considered the 
smart card and server roles played by SC and S, 
respectively. The role smart card appears in 
Figure 1. 
The role environment is shown in Figure 2. 
This role is used to find vulnerabilities in the 
protocol that an intruder (i) can use to break the 
security. In this case, the intruder is the network 
and it knows all the messages sent by role smart 
card and role server. 
We verify the following security goals: (1) 
confidentiality of the nonce generated by the 
smart card and server, and the session key; and 
 
Fig. 1. Role smart card in HLPSL 
 
Fig. 2. Role environment in HLPSL 
 
Fig. 3. Security goals 
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(2) authentication of the smart card and server. 
The security goals are shown in Figure 3. 
The verification was done using the back-end 
OFMC because it can be used to verify protocols 
which compute operations with or-exclusive. 
Moreover, the back-end OFMC can detect the 
following attacks: replay and parallel session. The 
total number of nodes that have been tested was 
2,636 in 3.81 seconds. Figure 4 shows the results 
of the simulation. 
From the result, we can conclude that the 
proposed protocol is secure under the test of 
AVISPA and it achieves the security goals. 
5.4 Comparison 
We compare our proposal with Li-Lee’s scheme in 
terms of security goals. Table 2 summarizes the 
security comparison. 
The proposed scheme does not need a 
verification table. As it is explained in [3] and [8], 
an attacker or intruder can modify or extract 
sensitive information from the database. For that 
reasons, Chan and Wu proposed a remote 
password authentication without verification table. 
The proposed scheme keeps the user 
anonymity during the registration phase and login 
phase. As it is explained in [6], an attacker or 
intruder can get access to the network in order to 
obtain the user’s identity. By means of this action, 
the attacker or intruder can trace the user’s 
activity and can make identity theft attack. For 
that reasons, Das, Saxena and Gulati introduced 
the concept of dynamic identity. 
6 Conclusions 
In this paper, we proposed a new remote user 
authentication scheme which removes all the 
security flaws found in Li-Lee’s scheme described 
in Section 3. The proposed scheme can resist 
very well-known attacks and achieves all the 
security goals that a secure remote user 
authentication scheme should have. We 
evaluated the security of our proposal using 
HLPSL, AVISPA tool, and back-end OFMC. After 
the simulation, the result was safe. 
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Fig. 4. Results from back-end OFMC 
Table 2. Security comparison between our scheme 
and Li-Lee’s scheme 
Security goals Li-Lee’s 
scheme 
Our 
scheme 
Without verification table No Yes 
Users choose password 
freely 
Yes Yes 
No password reveal Yes Yes 
Mutual authentication Yes Yes 
Session key agreement Yes Yes 
User anonymity No Yes 
Efficiency for wrong 
password login 
No Yes 
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